Read PDF Network Centric Warfare: Coalition Operations in the Age of US Military Primacy (Adelphi series)

Free download. Book file PDF easily for everyone and every device. You can download and read online Network Centric Warfare: Coalition Operations in the Age of US Military Primacy (Adelphi series) file PDF Book only if you are registered here. And also you can download or read online all Book PDF file that related with Network Centric Warfare: Coalition Operations in the Age of US Military Primacy (Adelphi series) book. Happy reading Network Centric Warfare: Coalition Operations in the Age of US Military Primacy (Adelphi series) Bookeveryone. Download file Free Book PDF Network Centric Warfare: Coalition Operations in the Age of US Military Primacy (Adelphi series) at Complete PDF Library. This Book have some digital formats such us :paperbook, ebook, kindle, epub, fb2 and another formats. Here is The CompletePDF Book Library. It's free to register here to get Book file PDF Network Centric Warfare: Coalition Operations in the Age of US Military Primacy (Adelphi series) Pocket Guide.


  1. Network Centric Warfare: Coalition Operations in the Age of US Military Primacy
  2. Government of Canada navigation bar
  3. Network Centric Warfare and Coalition Operations: New Military Operating System – CyberWar

Davis, Lynn E. Information Warfare and Security. Denning, Peter ed. New York: Addison-Wesley, DKL QA Market Bosworth, United Kingdom, June Dunnigan, James F. New York: St. Martin's Press, DKL UF National Security. Universal Publishers, c Fredericks, Brian. Information Warfare: Seriously!! Garian, Robert. DKL I China as Peer Competitor? Geyer, Michael.

  • Le Tour décrou (French Edition)?
  • Information warfare and information operations by Clifford Stone - Issuu!
  • Toppsta - Childrens Books – Reviews.
  • Neuroengineering.
  • Autres titres intéressants!

Information Warfare: Combating the Threat in the 21st Century. Gray, Chris Hables. Contents: 1. Military operations and information systems. Emergence of networks. Expeditionary Air Force and information networks. Framework for computer network defense. Stray Voltage: War in the Information Age. Military Forces. Henning, Paul R. Edward, eds. The Information Revolution and International Security. Significant issues series, v.

Hundley, Richard O. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, DKL QA DKL HV Jincheng, Wei. Khalilzad, Zalmay and John White eds. Perth, South Australia, Information Warfare and Organizational Decision-Making. Boston, MA: Artech House, c Strategic Information Warfare: A Concept. Working Paper No, Lawrence, R.

Protection Information Warfare Workshop Results. Lesser, Ian O. Countering the New Terrorism. Overview of Information Warfare: Principles and Practice. Lynx Publishing, November Libicki, Martin C. New York: Cambridge University Press, Defending Cyberspace and Other Metaphors. The Future of Information Security. McNair Paper no. What Is Information Warfare? Liu, Peng and Sushil Jajodia. Trusted Recovery and Defensive Information Warfare. Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic, DKL KF Army War College, Information Warfare: Impact and Concerns.

Miller, Robert D. Strategic Information Warfare Rising. Wilson and Robert H. Strategic Vulnerabilities: Threats Against Society. Riddle, and Peter A. London; New York: Routledge, DKL HM Martins Press, Naval Studies Board. Committee on Technology for Future Naval Forces. Information in Warfare. T42 v. Neilson, Robert E. The Art of Information War. Nelson, The New International Security Review Nichiporuk, Brian. Noone, James A. Shultz, Jr. Security Policy. D thesis — Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Rowe, Wayne. Rushkoff, Douglas. Crecine and Alethia H. Schleher, D. Electronic Warfare in the Information Age.

Boston, MA: Artech House, Information Warfare: Chaos on the Electronic Superhighway. Significant Issues Series, v. Operation Integration of Information Warfare. Sovereign, Michael G. Information Attack: Information Warfare In Air Force series. US Information Warfare. Jane's special report DKL U Decker and Colleen M. Stewart John and John Corder. War in the Information Age. DKL D IN: Cross, Sharyl et al eds. Global Security Beyond the Millennium. New York: St Martins Press, , p. Toffler, Alvin.

The Third Wave. New York: Bantam Books, DKL HN Boston: Little, Brown, United States. Air Force. Cornerstones of Information Warfare. Air Force Information Warfare Center. Select Committee on Intelligence. Wednesday, January 28, DKL Y 4. Defense Science Board. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Defensive Information Warfare Implementation. CJCSI Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, ? President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection.

Critical Foundations: Protecting America's Infrastructures. Washington, DC, Information Warfare: Principles and Operations. Information Warfare in a Joint and National Context. Westwood, Chris. Fellowship paper no. Air Power Studies Centre, Wheatley Gary F. Information Warfare and Deterrence. Washington, National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies, Information as a Weapon: Reality Versus Promises. Winkler, J. Ackerman, Robert K. Information Infrastructure. Adam, John A. Adams, Charlotte. Adams, Thomas K. Aftergood, Steven. Ahari, M. Aldrich, Richard W. Alger, John I.

Allard, Kenneth. Irvine and Roger R. Anthes, Gary H. Easy Target for Cyberattacks. Anthony, Keith D. Arnett, Eric H. Arnold, Wallace C. Ayers, Robert. Bacevich, Andrew J. Baines, Thomas B. Bangkok, Robert Karniol. Barlow, John P. Barwinczak, Patricia M. Bateman, Robert L. Bates, James C. Bean, Mark H. Belen, Fred C. Bender, Brian. Bergman, Kenneth R. Berkowitz, Bruce. Berkowitz, Bruce D. Betz, David J. Bigelow, Brad. Black, Peter. Blaker, Jim. Blank, Stephen. Blazer, Ernest. Blenkin, M. Boatman, John. Bodnar, John W. Boldrick, Michael R. Boorda, Jeremy M. Bolt, Paul J. Boulanger, A.

Bowdish, Randall G. Bowers, Stephen R. Braunberg, Andrew C. Bristow, Damon. Brohm, Gerard P. Broucek, Vlasti and Paul Turner. Brown, Charlie G. Brown, David and John Burlage. Brown, George C. Creating an Information Warfare Branch. Bulloch, Gavin. Bunker, Robert J. Bunkers, Frank. Burgess, Sean P. Burke, Charles M. Burnette, Gerald.

Busey, James B. Busuttil, Tyrone B. Callum, Robert. Camacho, Paul R. Campen, Alan D. Signal, June , v. Capaccio, Tony and Mary Greczyn. Caravella, Frank J. Carlin, John. Caruth, Greg and J. Collie Johnson. Carver, Curtis A. Casper, Lawrence E. April , v. Cebrowski, Arthur K. Celko, Joe. Chaisson, Kernan. Chambers, Elai C. Chandler, Clifford E. Chenery, John T.

Cimbala, Stephen J. Clapper, James R. Trevino, Jr. Clauer, John A.

Network Centric Warfare: Coalition Operations in the Age of US Military Primacy

Cline, Mary Ann. Clodfelter, Mark and John M. Fawcett, Jr. Cohen, Eliot A. Cohen, Fred. Colucci, Frank. Constance, Paul. Cook, Nick. Cook, Nick, et al. Confronts an Illusive Foe. Cooper, Pat, and Robert Holzer. Cooper, Pat and Frank Oliveri. Corcoran, Michael J. Corless, Josh. Cormier, Ken. Coroalles, Anthony M. Air Force Magazine, December , v. Crilley, Kathy. Critchlow, Robert D. Croft, Michael. Cronin, Blaise. Cronin, Blaise and Holly Crawford. Cross, Michael. Crowell, William P. Curtis, Ian G. Curts, Raymond J. Czerwinski, Thomas J. Dark, Ken. Darnton, Geoffrey. Davis, John W. Davis, Norman C.

Dearth, Douglas H. Debban, Alan W. DeGroat, Arthur S. Devereaux, Christopher. Devost, M, B. Houghton and N. Dezhin, E. DiCenso, David J. Dick, Charles. Dietz, Lawrence D. DiNardo, R. Dornheim, Michael A. Echevarria, Antulio J, II. Eden, Steven J. Edmiston, James P. Edmonds, Albert J. Edwards, Sean J. Ehlers, Vernon J. Emmett, Peter C. Eriksson, E. Essig, Christopher G. Evancoe, Paul. Evancoe, Paul R. Evers, Stacey. Evers, Stacey and Rupert Pengelley. Farris, Kate.

Fecci, Jo Marie. Felker, Edward J. FitzGerald, Mary C. FitzSimonds, James R. Van Tol. Flynt, Bill. Fogleman, Ronald R. Forster, Anthony. Fowler, Bruce W. Fox, Robert. Franks, Fredrick M. Freakley, Benjamin C. Fredericks, Brian E. Friedman, Norman. Fulghum, David A. Gallogly-Staver, Erin J. Gambel, Daniel W. Gehly, Darryl. Gelbach, Douglas K. Gellman, Robert. Gentry, John A. Giboney, Thomas B.

Glashow, Jason. Goldman, Alan R. Gompert, David C. Goodman, Glenn W. Goodman, Sy E. Goodwin, Brent Stuart. Gourley, Robert D.

Government of Canada navigation bar

Gray, Colin S. Gray, Jim. Green, Gerald. Gregory, Thomas E. Grier, Peter. Griffin, Gary B. Grimes, Vincent P. Grohoski, David C. Steven M. Seybert and Marc J. Guilbault, R. Haertling, Kenneth P. Haibeck, Kevin S. Hammes, Thomas X. Hammond, James W. Hancock, Bill. Hankins, Michelle L. Hardy, Stephen M. Harig, Paul T. Haslam, Emily. Hayes, Richard E. Edward Peartree. Herd, Graeme P. Herman, Mark. Hinde, Stephen. Hobby, Jason.

Holzer, Robert.

Network Enabled Capability

Navy Begins Information War Effort. Houghtaling, Pamela A. Hubbard, Zachary P. That is to say, states are not only concerned with state-on-state military threats but also military and non-military risks and threats that flow from non-state actors and transnational processes, which can undermine them at sub-state lev- els. Force projection abroad itself requiring military cooperation with police and other agencies , therefore, takes place in a context where security threats and thinking about security has broadened from military to non-military issues as well as deepened from the level of the state to sub-state levels.

Meanwhile, especially in states with all-volunteer forces, the public becomes more distant from its military even if, from time to time, it finds its armed ser- vices presented to it in the media spotlight, sometimes concerning matters about which the military and the civilian population can be proud courage under fire, bravery, and the award of medals , or otherwise where embarrassment or shame is the order of the day the abuse of prisoners or the lack of dignity with which the dead are treated.

One of these ways is the matter of casualty sensitivity. International mis- sions, even if supported by an international legitimate authority such as the United Nations, are less and less likely to have the charisma of national territo- rial missions that entail dealing with a military threat from a contiguous state. Events both in Iraq and Afghanistan reflect this de- velopment, as does the attempt by some participating governments to ensure their own formations bear as small a risk of death in combat as possible. So while international politics might dictate the need for international missions including Peace Support Operations to comprise contributions from a number of different states, there will be tensions in terms of competence, doctrine, and the attitude toward risk each country brings to a mission.

In conducting these missions, armed services do far more than apply or threaten to apply lethal force. As we saw earlier, Smith argues they are there to ameliorate, to contain, to deter and coerce, or to destroy. The strategic use of force is exceptional as the military is asked to achieve political goals, and nor- mally the most that can be expected is a condition in which an acceptable out- come can be delivered by the political process. At the same time, tensions between coalition participants need to be mitigated while relations with non-military actors also need to be managed.

Recent devel- opments confirm an observation made some years ago by Bernard Boene: wars amongst the people must involve the officer corps of intervening states of the West in a more assertive military profession. From the end of the Cold War until the middle of the nineties, Belgium and the Netherlands had begun suspending conscription, and it seemed obvious that other states would follow this trend in the years to come. Since , when The Economist made its prognosis, until , another thirteen European con- script-based armed forces have followed suit, phasing out the citizen soldier system.

The primary causes of this process undoubtedly are the end of the Cold War, the demise of the Soviet Union on 26 December and, therefore, the end of the territorial threat in the West-East conflict. The risk of interstate wars in Western, Central, and Eastern Europe has been reduced to practically zero. Under increasing domestic pressure to reduce defense spending, conscription-based mass armies have been scaled down and fewer conscripts have been called in.

The wars in the Balkans and the military involvement of the Europeans, however, have reduced the euphoria in the military. For the first time since their founding, NATO and finally the European Union had to prove reliable in a war and militarily-based conflict resolutions. Today it is not the defense of national territory, but the stabilization of crisis regions at the periphery, often far from Europe, that dominates the spectrum of military tasks.

This mission and structural change process has been given further momentum by the involvement of the armed forces in the war on terror and by the need for domestic security. Our thesis is that enhanced formal and informal European security integration, as well as the challenge of new missions out of the national area, are speeding up the phasing out of conscrip- tion. As a personnel recruiting system, conscription is unsuitable for armed forces of the constabulary type. There are three main reasons, at different lev- els, for this: 1. The strategic level.

Out-of-area constabulary military missions are generally carried out on a multinational basis i. Operations of this kind require a minimum common se- curity and mission doctrine as well as a high degree of interoperability, stand- ardization, and professionalization of the participating nations, not only at headquarters level, but at all levels of operation. The case can be made that to the extent to which Europeans complement their political and socio-economi- cal integration with military integration, the probability rises that conscription will disappear in Europe.

The operational level. The new kinds of threats terrorism and military mis- sions of the constabulary type peace support missions, police assistance for homeland security require a much higher degree of stand-by readiness, deployability, and sustainability over time than was the case during the Cold War within the framework of mass armies.

Compulsory citizen soldiers are not well suited for the new missions entailing longstanding operations beyond national borders. Longer-serving volunteers are needed. Therefore, the assumption can be made that to the extent to which a country engages in inter- national out-of-area stabilizing missions, the possibility of its conscription ra- tio dropping and conscription being suspended eventually will rise. The individual level. European countries cannot compel their conscripts to par- ticipate in out-of-area missions.

In the eyes of the public, conscripted citizens are classic defenders of their nation or allied territories. The more extensively a nation is engaged in international stabilizing operations, the higher the proba- bility that the conscript defense forces will be given up in favor of recruiting of volunteers for the armed forces. The trend towards a deepening of European military integration in the framework of NATO and the European Union linked to the rise in the number of multinational operations and the trend towards the constabularization of forces must therefore be seen as two important interlinked driving factors in the phasing-out of conscription.

In order to support the thesis, the extent and speed of the decline of conscription in Europe will first be specified. Second, the wave of transformation that the armed forces are currently undergoing, moving them away from mass armies towards forces of the constabulary type, will be out- lined in the context of mission change. The facts and figures in the publications from to have been used for this study. For methodological reasons, not all European armed forces are included in the following explanations and calculations.

The database in the Military Balance does not seem to be sufficient for all years, especially in the case of the former USSR states and the new Balkan states. The following states are completely excluded from the empirical calculations in the next chap- ters because of lack of appropriate data: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldavia, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia, and the Ukraine. Additionally, because the aim of this article is to illustrate how the increase in international peace missions has acted in favor of the phas- ing out of conscription, we have left out the United Kingdom, Ireland, Luxem- bourg, and Malta.

The armed forces of these countries are traditionally volunteer-based. With the above states excluded, our working sample includes twenty-seven European countries. The conscript ratio CR is defined as the percentage of conscripts relative to the total strength of the active armed forces. A third indicator not derived from Military Balance is the extent of socio-political and military integration in Europe. It takes into consideration the number of memberships in political and military organizations.

The downsizing was gener- ally handled in such a manner that mainly compulsory personnel were reduced, and contract soldiers were not affected. In this way, the social character of all European armies began to change. Large mass armies defined by conscripts turned into lean professional military organizations dominated by volunteers.

In , with the end of the Cold War, continental Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals was a homogenous conscription region Table 2. With the 0 FIGURE 2. Manning levels in European conscript armies — Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies — In a first phase, shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, coun- tries in Western Europe such as Belgium and the Netherlands decided to end conscription. France was followed by Spain, which suspended con- scription under the conservative government of Aznar, as well as by Portugal and Italy. Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovakia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina will have transformed their conscript systems into volunteer forces by the end of this decade.

Also, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Poland have decided to suspend their conscript system soon. In Greece, Ukraine, and Sweden it is just a matter of time before the government decides to make the same move. Originally, Russia had intended to do so as well but has meanwhile postponed the step. In , Denmark decided to call up conscripts on a mandatory basis only in the event that the Danish forces do not find enough volunteer conscripts and enlisted per- sonnel on the labor market. To sum up, fifteen European countries have to date abolished conscription, and in seven countries the decision has been made or will be made soon.

Network Centric Warfare and Coalition Operations: New Military Operating System – CyberWar

This fact clearly emphasizes the traditional function of the draft as a national military concept for national defense. The diminishing significance of conscription is best illustrated by the devel- opment of CRs. However, the average figures conceal a significant degree of variety among the European forces. This becomes evident when analyzing the changing CRs in specific countries Figure 2. All in all, it becomes evident that since , with few exceptions, almost all European states have markedly reduced the number of citizen-soldiers.

Low- ering the CR is often the first step to abandoning it completely. On the other hand, phasing out conscription obviously does not necessarily mean abolishing it altogether. Conscript ratios of nineteen countries. Average — in comparison to without Albania. A first significant indicator of the impact of new missions on the phasing out of conscription can be obtained by analyzing the chronology of reform steps taken with the escalation of the war in the Balkans and the intensified international interventions by the Europeans.

As a rule, this wave of reform lacked strategic vision and was devoid of serious questioning of the mass-army principle as such. Military service durations were shortened, heavy ground-war material sold or disposed of, barracks closed, and military locations abandoned. The primary goal was to reduce cost through cutbacks in personnel, weapons, and equipment.

The peace dividend was being collected, and national defense became a secondary task. Only one country, Belgium, ventured a radical breach with the past by suspend- ing conscription as early as Thus, without excessive simplification, this first phase can be termed the downsizing wave. It manifested itself in rapidly increasing international cooperation in military affairs as well as in the conceptual and strategic transformation of the military apparatuses to face an expanded spectrum of tasks.

Within the framework of the NATO Partnership for Peace PfP platform established in , international cooperation began to extend increasingly beyond the borders of the Alliance. As a consequence of its hegemonic position, for many non-NATO countries, the Alliance developed into an example of the realign- ment of strategy and structure of armed forces during the second wave of reform. This is not only true of the post-communist countries of Eastern and Central Europe, but also of neutral countries such as Austria and Switzerland, whose distance from the Alliance visibly diminished in the mid-nineties.

The European Union security policy cooperation, driven by the Maastricht Treaty of , which aimed for a common security and defense policy, inten- sified markedly during this period. A common defense planning and procurement procedure was established. The terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September and the conflicts that followed in Afghanistan and Iraq can be seen as a multiplier of this reform wave. The military focus of most European nations is now clearly on missions abroad in a multinational context.

The former primary task of national defense is being relegated to a secondary position, whereas former secondary functions police tasks and subsidiary and rescue services are given the rank of primary tasks. This prioritization becomes manifest when we look at the list of military tasks in official documents. This, in turn, demands a higher and transnationally standardized technological standard in weapon systems, equipment, and transport capabilities.

At the same time, the emergence of a transnational military role is promoted within the European state system, in which single countries develop specific competences that can be called on in joint operations to meet specific needs. A close examination reveals that one can speak of a constabularization of the military not only on an international but also on a national level.

As a consequence of the developments described, conscription is degenerat- ing more and more into a second-rate reserve pool or is losing its function alto- gether. Conscription, where it is upheld, serves national tradition rather than military efficiency. First, professionalism is becoming the rule in Europe, and military service based on conscription the exception. Second, European forces are used to an increasing extent for constabulary tasks, be they peace or stabilization operations out of the national territory or police support missions of all kinds at home.

One has to keep in mind that the proportion of logistic personnel expenses and reserves for replacement ranges from to if one compares troops at home bound for missions in a foreign region with those currently deployed. With the exception of Norway, all European states have increased the number of troops based abroad during the last decade.

In most cases the increase is signifi- cant, as Figure 2. In absolute numbers, in , according to Military Balance, 22, military personnel from these twenty-seven European countries were sent on missions abroad. In , a remarkable increase took place 47, persons ; thus, the figure has more than doubled. In keeping with their military tradition, these countries have always been classic peacekeeping countries and also participated during the Cold War.

In , the situation changed dramatically. The growth of the out-of-area ratio OoAR of twenty-seven European countries — But Norway, Belgium, and Finland also have large numbers of forces abroad in relation to the strength of their armed forces. In this group we find all-volunteer forces as well as conscript-based armed forces. But, as Figure 2. The lowest OoARs are found in states with conscription.

Apart from Portugal, most of these countries still maintain draft-based mass armies, their CR being high in comparison to other armed forces that have abol- ished conscription. The burden of the relatively small foreign engagement is gener- ally carried by a small professional core of these armed forces, complemented with volunteers recruited on a temporary basis, often conscripts, who volunteer for longer service abroad. Figure 2. First, according to our initial thesis, the increase in European cooperation on political, social, and security policy levels implies the inclination of the cooper- ating countries to engage increasingly in international stabilization missions.

As Table 2.


NATO country abbreviations defined in Figure 2. Conscription and international integration, 27 Countries Memberships System 0 1 2 3 Conscription Albania Austria Bulgaria Germany armies Switzerland Croatia Denmark Greece Finland Estonia Poland Sweden Latvia Turkey Lithuania Norway Romania All-volunteer Slovakia Belgium forces Slovenia Czech Republic France Hungary Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain Indirectly, this means that the more extensively a country is integrated into a European network of political and security political alliances, as well as supra- national coalitions, the more likely it is to cooperate more closely on a military level and in missions of a constabulary type as well.

The conscription ratio will thus drop until it is finally abolished. It is no accident, and fits into the picture as outlined, that it is primarily the neutral countries that are having a hard time giving up their citizen forces Switzerland, Albania, Austria, Finland, Sweden. Table 2. On the other hand, the trend towards a common security and military policy accelerated by multinational interventions, mainly in the Balkans and in Af- ghanistan, has fuelled the process of constabularization of European forces.

These two developments must be seen as important agents speeding up the phasing out of citizen armies in Europe. No European people would be ready to legitimize the compulsory employment of young conscripts in missions out of national or alliance territory, nor would they be ready to tol- erate casualties among such personnel in out-of-area missions. The tradition of conscription is symbolically linked with national defense and with guaranteeing national existence. The new tasks of a constabulary nature in an international context are radically different. First, they are devoid of the character of guaran- teeing national existence, and second, they require a much higher degree of stand-by capability and more sustainability than traditional citizen armies with their part-time soldiers can provide.

The consequences are obvious. To the extent to which military organizations in Europe are used for purposes other than interstate war, conscription is prov- ing obsolete and is being abolished in a growing number of European states. The military future belongs, as in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, to small forces-in-being. These forces are becoming more and more interwoven on the European level, be it within NATO or within a slowly form- ing alliance of European forces that is manifest in several multinational corps and is beginning to emerge in the framework of the planned European battle groups.

The incident was immediately publicized by all the main Israeli news channels and caused the Israel Defense Forces IDF and the Defense Minister to swiftly condemn the behavior of the soldiers as unnecessary and out of line. Regardless of the fact that the IDF soldiers were not part of a peace support operation PSO , the basic dilemmas they faced are typical and rather universal ones faced by soldiers that are part of any PSO. The incident serves to highlight some of the unique and specific challenges that soldiers in PSOs are facing.

According to British doctrine, PSOs are defined as an operation that impar- tially makes use of diplomatic, civil, and military means, normally in pursuit of U.


Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Without the active cooperation and consent of the indigenous popu- lation, there can be no self-sustaining peace. The action should be proportional and discriminatory such that it is con- fined in effect to the intended target. Further, these skills are demanded despite the fact that most soldiers are trained to fight and win conventional wars. A simple incident at a road block can have far-reaching strategic implications.

This chapter explores this phenomenon while arguing that conventional military approaches to dealing with the issue are not very effective. Following this anal- ysis, some possible directions will be suggested for reducing the damage this phenomenon causes. Kru- lak from the U. Marines in an article he published in the U. Marines Corps Journal. The combination inevitably puts military personnel in very complicated and difficult situations, which often do not have a clear solu- tion. At the same time, mistakes in these situations may be very costly. In these situations the actions and split-second decisions of often very low-ranking commanders can have a direct impact on not only on their immediate surround- ings, but on the overall success of the entire mission or even the stability of the whole region.

The quotation explains how the British Support Operations Doctrine explains the challenge most modern militaries face today: In PSOs, actions taken at the lowest tactical level may need to be especially respon- sive to strategic decision making, with the tactical outcomes having immediate strate- gic significance. This may lead to political and military leaders at the strategic level wishing directly to influence the lowest tactical actions, missing out the intermediate operational and higher tactical levels of command.

Such opportunities lead to swift and decisive results, not only at the tactical but also at the strategic level. This point will be illustrated in two famous cases of strategic initiative by junior level commanders.

Search form

The fall of Fort Eban-Emael signified a strategic achievement and opened the way for the advancing German forces. The formidable fort fell primarily due to the ini- tiative of German First Lieutenant Rudolf Witzig and his non-commissioned of- ficer NCO , who overcame a complicated situation and a numerically superior enemy. He chose instead to retreat quietly and reported his findings to his division commander, who was looking for alternative ways to cross the Canal.

In PSOs, low-level initiative can rarely lead to strategic resolution. To conclude, then, acting wrongly on the tactical level might occupy the full attention and energy not only of the higher military operational and strategic level, but also the national security level, beyond the military echelons. These events are often dealt with directly by ministers, political leaders, international organizations, and even the courts.

Unfortunately, the uninhibited behavior of resistance fighters and terrorists, including the manipulation of women and children as combatants, often places the corporal on the ground in the face of real life and death situations, forcing split-second decisions with impacts on fate of the mis- sion. He describes an event whereby he received information on a potential plot to drive a car full of explosives into a packed synagogue.

When Bar Lev spotted a car that fit the description of the suspect car, he immediately and intentionally collided with it. The collision injured passengers in both cars, but the attack was averted and the terrorists were captured. When then Prime Minister Rabin came to visit the unit to praise them for their courage, Bar Lev asked him what would have happened had he made a mistake in identification and collided with an innocent car, injuring innocent civilians.

Rabin, in his famous frankness, told him that had he failed, he would have found himself alone. When he approached the car after the shooting, he found four dead terrorists, but he could not avoid thinking what would have happened had the dead been four innocent people, possibly a family with young children. When it is a failure, you are left to your own devices to face the harsh reality. Commanders understood that they will not receive any backing … consequently they prefer to avoid any initi- ative and repress the offensive tendencies of their units to avoid failures.

What makes them so fearful of mistakes? Smith uses a powerful meta- phor to explain the problematic situations he found himself in as a senior com- mander in Bosnia and Northern Ireland. He speaks about a Roman circus where the commander fights the enemy while everyone watches. His role is not only to fight but to be the circus producer: In these situations, instead of only you and a gang of gladiators, there is at least one other producer and another gang of gladiators. His job is to produce the most compel- ling narrative and act it out, and every act he does is an act of sending information and causes an effect.

The currency in these types of operations is not who has more effective firepower, but who has more effective information, the type that will enable him to separate the enemy from the rest of the crowd. A classic example is the case of the Italian journalist Giuliana Sgrena. In February , she was kidnapped in Iraq and thereafter was held for one month and then released. As she was being driven to Baghdad International Airport, the car she was riding in came under fire from U.

Sgrena was seriously injured. Giuliana Sgrena and the Italian government have denied U. While the Pentagon cleared the troops involved of any wrongdoing, Italian prosecutors were pursuing the case and requested the indictment of U. Army Specialist Mario Lozano. This incident became a major source of tension between the Italian and U. This incident is also different from the above examples in that it represents a failure of the entire system and chain of command. Here it was not about having to make a split-second decision in the face of great uncertainty and risk making the wrong judgment call, but what seems to be the consistent misbehavior of a group of soldiers over a long period of time.

It gave ammunition for critics of U. The U. Administration and its defend- ers argued that the abuses were isolated acts committed by low-ranking person- nel. However, not act- ing runs contrary to the basic combat training and ethos of NCOs. On the contrary, the message in most contemporary doctrines of Western militaries is to reemphasize mission command. The approach calls for subordinates to exploit opportunities by being empowered to use their initiative and judgment, as long as their decisions serve the higher objective communicated to them prior to the mission, which is referred to as intent.

Mission command requires above all a shared doctrine and trust, which implies tolerance for learning and latitude for honest mistakes, professionalism, and inclination for initiative. The superior defines clearly the intent, mis- sion, resources, and constraints, and leaves the subordinates the freedom to exe- cute the mission the way he or she sees best according to these parameters. If the situation then changes, the subordinate is also empowered to change the mission according to the higher intent.

Mission command asks the commander to provide means and to delegate authority, however it is crucial to note, one can never delegate responsibility. Yet there are some basic flaws in this approach. During the Cold War years, the West, facing the Soviet threat, was searching for ways to balance its relative quantitative inferiority. In its investigation of the fighting qualities of the Wehrmacht, mission command was discovered as a central virtue that gave the Germans an edge over their rivals.

The approach praises commanders such as Moltke the Elder, Patton, Sharon, and Yigal Alon, who always felt that their political masters were standing in the way and tried to push military achievement further with little regard for political and international implications. Indeed, the British doctrine also emphasizes the importance of knowing when not to act, but it is still hard to separate mission command from its origi- nal ethos.

Such was the case in Srebrenica. A careful and bal- anced view is required, keeping in mind the desire to deescalate and achieve le- gitimacy, both of which call for the minimum possible use of force. Other obstacles also exist, namely the diverse composition of forces in PSOs and the difference in training and services that diversity implies. Mis- sion command requires a highly professional force with strong mutual under- standing and a common professional language.

Third, mission command is tightly linked to the mission analysis and the estimation process that the military uses to assess the situation and devise its plans. The commander is then guided to think in the context of two levels above his own immediate mission. However, in PSOs, the relevant levels for reference can be all the way up top at the political level, if one can distinguish between these levels at all.

That is the reason why, in an interview with Dr. I felt that we were missing tools; I felt that the discourses in Central Command as well as in other places were not deep enough. They dealt with foam on water. The series of reactions and counter reactions is arguably char- acteristic and typify many soldiers and military organizations who find them- selves under similar scenarios conducting peacekeeping or similar missions, such as the coalition forces in Iraq or Afghanistan.

However, an IDF inquiry into the case a few days later came up with following points: The captain indeed repeatedly asked for reinforcement, saying his force was too small to deal properly with the situation. His request was rejected, and he was told to deal with the situation alone.

He concluded that the soldiers were not in life-threatening danger; therefore, there was no reason to behave so aggressively. Back at home the captain and his men, as civilians again after completing their reserve duty, released the following statement. He stated that he understood his mission the following way: defending the road block was serv- ing the higher purpose of preventing the demonstrators from passing down to a major highway running from Jerusalem to Beersheba and blocking this more strategic road.

This was his understanding of his mission, and he was intent on preventing a major road in Israel from being blocked. Reforming 21st Century Peacekeeping Operations. G Doucet. Gender, Military Effectiveness, and Organizational Change. The Battle for Pusan. Addison Terry. V S Yadav. Routledge Handbook of Defence Studies. David J. Samurai Strategies. Boye Lafayette De Mente. American Strategy in Vietnam. Harry G Summers Jr. Military Instructions of Frederick the Great.

Frederick II of Prussia. Defence Planning and Uncertainty. Lewis Sorley. Securing Freedom in the Global Commons. Scott Jasper. Avoiding Armageddon. Bruce Riedel. Transforming Military Power since the Cold War. Major Stanley A. Dmitry Rogozin. Technology, Ethics and the Protocols of Modern War. Artur Gruszczak. Lieutenant General Stanley Robert Larsen. Pauline Eadie. Drones and the Future of Air Warfare. Michael P.

  • The transformation of strategic affairs in SearchWorks catalog?
  • Thyroid Diet Guide: Beat Hypothyroidism & Live A Healthy Life.
  • Tiempo de memoria.
  • Confessions of a New York Matchmaker!

The Evolution of Cyber War. Brian M. The European Union and Military Force. Understanding Contemporary Strategy. Thomas M. Conflict and Cooperation in the Global Commons. Peacebuilding, Power, and Politics in Africa. Devon Curtis. Networked Operations and Transformation. Allan English. An Encyclopedia of Battles. David Eggenberger. Joakim Berndtsson. The Transformation of Strategic Affairs. Lawrence Freedman. Contemporary Military Theory. Jan Angstrom. A Question of Security. Michael Codner. Understanding Counterinsurgency. Thomas Rid. Occupational Hazards.