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  3. How We Remember: Brain Mechanisms of Episodic Memory - Michael E. Hasselmo - Google книги

In addition, the claim that thought about the future is based on our memories of the past was also made by researchers prior to the s e. In what follows we outline work on episodic foresight dividing it into the following two general categories: 1 verbal tasks, and 2 non-verbal tasks. For example, Hudson et al. Interestingly, 3-year-olds did not seem to be limited by their verbal ability but, rather, by their inability to predict an event that might plausibly occur in their personal futures.

Of course, a not mutually exclusive possibility is that older children succeeded by retrieving a specific past episode and merely projecting it into the future as opposed to thinking about the future, per se. For example, Quon and Atance asked children to respond to questions about specific events that would occur tomorrow e. Although Quon and Atance also found that performance improved with age, children seemed to perform better when asked about a specific future event vs.

If this line of reasoning is correct, then one hypothesis is that children should be able to describe events even more accurately were the event in question generated for them. And, indeed, findings by Hayne et al. Rather than asking children, themselves, to generate future events, Hayne et al.

Children were then interviewed about the future events provided by their parents. Hayne et al.

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For example, Atance and Meltzoff showed 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds photographs that depicted such scenarios as walking beside a waterfall, walking through a desert, and hiking up a mountain. Children were asked to pretend that they would visit these locations and to select one of three items to bring with them. The correct item e. Each of the three age groups chose the correct items at a rate higher than would be expected by chance 74, 91, 97, for the 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds, respectively ; though, overall, 4- and 5-year-olds performed significantly better than the 3-year-olds.

Finally, Suddendorf and Busby and Suddendorf et al. In fact, Suddendorf and Corballis proposed one of the most commonly used criteria of episodic foresight that has been used by both developmental and comparative psychologists. They suggested that having the future in mind should, at minimum, provide flexibility to the owner of such a behavior. In addition, one should rely on a single unique experience i. Based on these criteria, Suddendorf and Busby , Suddendorf et al. After this brief delay, children are told that they will return to the first room and are presented with several options; one of which i.

In these studies, 3-year-olds tend not to select the correct item at a rate higher than chance, whereas 4-year-olds do. However, if 3-year-olds are tested with no delay between the presentation of the problem and the opportunity to select an item with their back turned to the problem so that they cannot see it , their performance is significantly above chance e. Although we will return to this issue later in the paper, the need for children to remember past information e.

In sum, both verbal and non-verbal measures of episodic foresight tend to show age-related changes between ages 3 and 5. However, it is important to note that there are exceptions to this general pattern. For example, Hayne et al. These age differences are consistent with the idea that the extent to which memory episodic or semantic is involved in task success may vary as a function of the specific episodic foresight task. If memory is indeed critical for episodic foresight, then children should perform similarly on the yesterday and tomorrow questions.

In addition, there was a significant correlation between the number of accurate responses generated to the yesterday and tomorrow questions. Several of the non-verbal tasks that we outlined earlier also speak to the memory-foresight link. More specifically, recent studies using variations of Suddendorf et al. For example, Atance and Sommerville gave children a series of tasks in which they encountered a problem in one room e.

One of these items i. However, what particular aspect of the past and, hence, what form of memory can be argued to be critical to task success? Although the assumption is that it is episodic memory, to what extent might semantic memory also be necessary? We next explore how episodic foresight may be driven by both episodic and semantic memory. In contrast, semantic future thinking was originally conceived as the capacity to think about facts and context-free general conceptual knowledge e. As mentioned earlier, the idea that episodic memory is crucial for imagining future events is widespread in episodic foresight research Schacter and Addis, ; Suddendorf and Corballis, ; Szpunar and McDermott, More specifically, episodic memory is argued to allow for the extraction and combination of stored information to create new events.

In addition, authors have argued that past and future events draw on similar information and rely on common underlying processes Schacter and Addis, ; Suddendorf and Corballis, ; Klein, Thus, past experiences are used to anticipate possible future events and this is argued to have an important adaptive value. This hypothesis has been confirmed in a number of neuropsychological studies in which patients with impaired episodic memory fail not only at retrieving episodic memories but also at imagining personal future events Tulving, ; Hassabis et al.

It is important to note, however, that one can retrieve episodic information to anticipate a future situation without necessarily mentally projecting the s elf into this situation Pillemer, ; Szpunar, ; Osvath and Martin-Ordas, in press. For instance, as Osvath and Martin-Ordas in press mention remembering the last time I forgot my keys and got locked out of my apartment does not imply that every time I take my keys I do so because I project myself into the future event of having to call the locksmith.

Note though that the behavioral outcome in both situations i. So far we have described evidence supporting the idea that episodic memories are the basis for episodic foresight. However, recent research has brought into question the exclusive role of episodic memory in episodic foresight. In the following section we review evidence to this effect. Most of the evidence for the importance of semantic memory in episodic foresight has come from neuropsychological research e.

For example, Irish et al. Importantly these results suggest that semantic memory may be necessary for the construction of future events. Similarly, Maguire et al. Taken together, these results pose difficulty for the idea that the capacity for imagining new experiences is exclusively dependent on episodic details from past events.

If so, parents will report that this event is unlikely to occur the next day. In contrast, older children may be better at thinking more accurately about the specific events that they will engage in the next day. Thus, rather than generating a future, as might be the case with younger children, they are better at generating their own future see Klein, for a similar argument. This might imply that older children are relying on semantic memory e. It is possible that this filtering process is a function of the episodic system. For example, if one has a broken leg, it is possible to imagine the event of going skiing with this process likely drawing largely on semantic knowledge about skiing yet, one cannot realistically project into this event because of the constraint of having a broken leg.

If our line of reasoning is correct, this would imply that providing younger children with the event in question past or future would then allow them to elaborate upon it but they would nevertheless have difficulty generating it themselves. This argument is consistent with Hayne et al. In sum, whereas in Busby and Suddendorf children needed to generate the events in question, in Hayne et al.

What this might imply is that the episodic information is available to both younger and older children, but the way in which this information is accessed differs across ages. Whereas older children might be able to both generate their own cues and use external cues, younger children might only be able to access past memories when provided with external cues.

Accordingly, one would predict that the presence of cues in the current context might facilitate episodic foresight in younger children. However, only older children would be able to generate the necessary cues to think about a future event. This is an issue that requires additional empirical attention. Recall that Atance and Meltzoff found that 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds were all significantly above chance in selecting a correct item to address a potential future physiological state e. Here, age differences were detected, with both 4- and 5-year-olds providing significantly more justifications that referenced a future physiological state e.

Clearly, having some knowledge likely semantic in this case about the fact that raincoats are needed for rain or that Band-Aids are needed when one gets hurt is necessary for task success. In fact, this may be why 3-year-olds did so well on the item-choice measure. However, is this semantic knowledge sufficient? The fact that there were nonetheless significant age differences even on the item-choice measure suggests that it was not. Could episodic memory contributions be important as well? Along the same lines, in Russell et al.

Accordingly, it is difficult to argue that the 5-year-olds passed the future version of the task by simply drawing on semantic memory otherwise, younger children should also have passed. Rather, it is possible that the younger children correctly chose the items in the present condition because they did not need to rely on episodic memory. In contrast, thinking about what would be needed in their own future i. Interestingly, 4-year-olds had less difficulty choosing the correct items that another child might need in the future than they did choosing the items that they, themselves, would need.

Such self-other differences may in fact shed light on the extent to which semantic and episodic memory processes are involved in episodic foresight. More broadly, the role that such abilities as theory of mind play in episodic foresight e. We move next to tasks that have used two-room methodologies e.

Recall that in one task used by Atance and Sommerville , children were presented with a glass of juice glued to a tray and no straw with which to drink it in one room; several minutes later, in another room, they were given various items with which to solve the problem. In this case, the correct choice was a straw.

Arguably, at the most basic level, children needed to remember that there was a glass of juice on the table, for example. Interestingly, in Suddendorf et al.

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However, when children also needed to rely on their memory of the past event, these planning skills were insufficient to succeed. This interpretation is consistent with Hayne et al. Note that, at least in Suddendorf et al. The idea that, in some tasks, it may be possible to isolate a specific contribution of episodic memory is also nicely illustrated in a study by Metcalf and Atance Children were given a limited number of marbles and were told that they would spend 3 min in the first room and then, afterwards, 3 min in the second room.

However, children were also familiarized with both marble runs such that the experimenter showed them that when they put a marble down the run they were unable to retrieve it again. Of interest was whether children would save marbles for the second room, rather than use them all up in the first. Interestingly, children saved very few marbles and performance did not differ as a function of age.

Interestingly, children saved significantly more marbles in this second trial and, again, there were no age-related differences. However, the one-time event i. Thus, one might conclude that episodic memory was contributing to the increase in marble saving in this trial. The fact that trial 2 immediately followed trial 1, and that children may have been quite disappointed at not having any or few marbles to use in the large marble run may explain why the amount of marbles saved increased across all three age groups, and not just for the older children.

Conversely, it is possible that because the task involved more than one trial, children may have learned after the first trial that saving is a good strategy — such a rule being a function of memory that is more semantic, rather than episodic, in nature. When is it necessary, then, to remember emotional aspects of the episode itself e. In those instances in which the materials in question are ones that are familiar to children e. However, this association would not work when the future event involves the use of a straw but for a different problem e.

Thus, remembering a situation in which I used a straw for a different purpose than to drink might be necessary for successful performance in Russell et al. These experiences could be considered more episodic in nature because they would likely constitute a one-time event in the past that children draw upon to help their future planning. In some cases, most notably when the problem in question is more associative e. This idea is intimately related to the flexibility criterion proposed by Suddendorf and Corballis We suggest that the more novel the combination of past events used to construct the future event, the more flexible and creative or future-oriented the thought of an event becomes Osvath and Martin-Ordas, in press.

So far, we have been describing tasks of episodic foresight and we have argued that both semantic and episodic memory likely play a role in task success. However, we discuss this particular issue in more detail in this next section and also suggest some directions for future research.

There is no doubt that some form of memory is involved in the developmental tasks that have been used to assess episodic foresight. In what follows we further elaborate on different ways to study how both semantic and episodic memory contribute to episodic foresight. Suddendorf and Corballis and Suddendorf et al. Two important issues can be raised with respect to this criterion. First, most memory systems require repeated exposure to a stimulus for it to be retained Morris, Moreover, certain conditioning procedures have demonstrated that single trial exposure does not necessarily rule out associative learning e.

Second, we have already mentioned that some of our memories do not necessarily involve unique events e. As such, we argue that an important direction for future research is to analyze the roles of both unique and general events to episodic foresight. One way to do so is by asking parents to report general e. Then, children could be asked to imagine and describe either a general future event e. Because memories for general events are more semantic than episodic in nature, one would expect younger children to succeed at constructing and talking about general future events e.

In contrast, younger children would be expected to have more difficulty constructing unique future events e. In contrast, older children should be able to use information from both general and unique events. Therefore, one would expect them to successfully describe future events based on both general and unique events. Earlier in our paper, we argued that the studies by Hayne et al. Note, though, that these studies did not directly assess this issue and, hence, more controlled experiments are needed. Therefore, one could extend the line of research suggested above by asking children to use this information e.

This would allow us to directly test the idea of generative i. If providing children with a more specific cue helps them to more accurately describe a future event, then we would expect older children to perform better than younger children when no specific cue about a future event is provided. The fact that trial 2 immediately followed trial 1, and that children may have been quite disappointed at not having any or few marbles to use in the large marble run may explain why the amount of marbles saved increased across all three age groups, and not just for the older children.

Conversely, it is possible that because the task involved more than one trial, children may have learned after the first trial that saving is a good strategy — such a rule being a function of memory that is more semantic, rather than episodic, in nature. When is it necessary, then, to remember emotional aspects of the episode itself e. In those instances in which the materials in question are ones that are familiar to children e. However, this association would not work when the future event involves the use of a straw but for a different problem e.

Thus, remembering a situation in which I used a straw for a different purpose than to drink might be necessary for successful performance in Russell et al. These experiences could be considered more episodic in nature because they would likely constitute a one-time event in the past that children draw upon to help their future planning. In some cases, most notably when the problem in question is more associative e. This idea is intimately related to the flexibility criterion proposed by Suddendorf and Corballis We suggest that the more novel the combination of past events used to construct the future event, the more flexible and creative or future-oriented the thought of an event becomes Osvath and Martin-Ordas, in press.

So far, we have been describing tasks of episodic foresight and we have argued that both semantic and episodic memory likely play a role in task success. However, we discuss this particular issue in more detail in this next section and also suggest some directions for future research.

There is no doubt that some form of memory is involved in the developmental tasks that have been used to assess episodic foresight. In what follows we further elaborate on different ways to study how both semantic and episodic memory contribute to episodic foresight. Suddendorf and Corballis and Suddendorf et al. Two important issues can be raised with respect to this criterion.

First, most memory systems require repeated exposure to a stimulus for it to be retained Morris, Moreover, certain conditioning procedures have demonstrated that single trial exposure does not necessarily rule out associative learning e. Second, we have already mentioned that some of our memories do not necessarily involve unique events e. As such, we argue that an important direction for future research is to analyze the roles of both unique and general events to episodic foresight. One way to do so is by asking parents to report general e.

Then, children could be asked to imagine and describe either a general future event e. Because memories for general events are more semantic than episodic in nature, one would expect younger children to succeed at constructing and talking about general future events e. In contrast, younger children would be expected to have more difficulty constructing unique future events e. In contrast, older children should be able to use information from both general and unique events.

Therefore, one would expect them to successfully describe future events based on both general and unique events. Earlier in our paper, we argued that the studies by Hayne et al. Note, though, that these studies did not directly assess this issue and, hence, more controlled experiments are needed. Therefore, one could extend the line of research suggested above by asking children to use this information e.

This would allow us to directly test the idea of generative i. If providing children with a more specific cue helps them to more accurately describe a future event, then we would expect older children to perform better than younger children when no specific cue about a future event is provided. This is because while younger children might be able to elaborate upon an event that is provided to them as in Hayne et al. Imagining a future event in a constructive manner i.

However, semantic learning also provides us with flexible behaviors Osvath and Martin-Ordas, in press. For example, we can use a pen to write with, but we can also use it as a blowpipe. We can do this solely by having an understanding of the function and properties of pens. In other words, imagining how to use a pen as a blowpipe does not rest on our ability to remember a specific event in which we needed a blowpipe. If existing semantic knowledge suffices for future-oriented decisions, when does the use of episodic projection become necessary?

Imagine the following scenario: You know that tools are always kept in the toolbox; however, in one past instance you placed the screwdriver in a different location e. If you now needed to find the screwdriver, where would you search for it? If relying solely on your semantic knowledge, you would go and search inside the toolbox because that is where the screwdriver usually is. But what would you do if you did not find it there? In this case, only the memory of the specific event in which you put the screwdriver inside the drawer would allow you to successfully search for it in the drawer and not in the cupboard.

We suggest that developing experimental tasks that reflect this example could provide insights about the specific contributions of episodic and semantic memory in episodic foresight — especially in young children. More specifically, we would predict that, in such scenarios, children with a non-fully developed episodic system would have difficulty.

In contrast, older children would be able to retrieve the unique past experience needed to successfully find the tool. Developmental findings suggest that the capacity for episodic foresight develops substantially between the ages of 3 and 5. We have pointed out that even though episodic memory seems to be intimately related to episodic foresight, the role that both semantic and episodic memory play in episodic foresight is only now starting to be addressed.

We also suggest that episodic foresight might be possible without the need to recall episodic memories and, based on this idea, we have proposed new avenues of research that could provide us with important insights about the ontogeny of episodic foresight. The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest. Addis, D. Neuropsychologia 47, — Remembering the past and imagining the future: common and distinct neural substrates during event construction and elaboration.

Neuropsychologia 45, — Atance, C. Dere, A. Easton, L. Nadel, and J. Huston Amsterdam: Elsevier Press , 99— Bauer and R. Episodic future thinking. Trends Cogn. The emergence of episodic future thinking in humans. CrossRef Full Text. Memory 22, — Balota, D. Byrne, H. Eichenbaum, R. Menzel, H. Roediger III, and D.

Sweatt Amsterdam: Elsevier , — Barsalou, L. Neisser and E. Buckner, R. Self-projection and the brain. Busby, J. Recalling yesterday and predicting tomorrow. Chalfonte, B. Feature memory and binding in young and older adults. Cheke, L. Mental Time Travel in Animals. Wiley Interdiscip. Conway, M. Sensory-perceptual episodic memory and its context: autobiographical memory. Memory and the self. Frequency, characteristics, and functions of future-oriented thoughts in daily life.

Dudai, Y. The Janus face of Mnemosyne. Nature , Duval, C. What happens to personal identity when semantic knowledge degrades? A study of the self and autobiographical memory in semantic dementia. Neuropsychologia 50, — Eichenbaum, H. How does the brain organize memories? Science , — Eisenberg, A. Learning to describe past experience in conversation. Discourse Process.


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    How We Remember: Brain Mechanisms of Episodic Memory - Michael E. Hasselmo - Google книги

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